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Analyzing Horizontal Mergers:
Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated Markets
ABSTRACT
This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the
antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated
markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be
“unilateral” – that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices
while other firms in the market do not. More realistically, nonmerging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the
merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the postmerger firm’s prices rise. The unilateral effects theory is robust and
has become quite conventional in merger analysis. There is
certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any more conjecture
than what occurs in traditional concentration-increasing merger
analysis. Nevertheless, as with all predictions about mergers, we
must live with a certain measure of uncertainty.
Analyzing Horizontal Mergers:
Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated Markets
Herbert Hovenkamp *

Introduction: diversion ratios and critical loss analysis
The impact of a merger among “adjacent” firms in a productdifferentiated market is illustrated by a well-known diagram, shown in
Figure A, of a row of hot dog vendors arrayed across a beach during
the summer, spaced approximately 50 yards apart. 1 Assume that the
*
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The illustration comes from Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 Econ. J.
41 (1929). See also Jonathan B. Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of
Horizontal Mergers, in Antitrust Law & Economics (Keith Hylton, ed., 2009) (excellent,
moderately technical); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive
Effects of Horizontal Mergers, ch. 3, in Handbook of Antitrust Economics (Paolo

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359288
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hot dogs and their vendors are physically identical but the
differentiation applies to the variable distances that bathers must
walk in order to reach a hot dog stand. Assume further that the premerger price of each vendor is a dollar, and that bathers, who are
the potential customers, are willing to pay as much as two dollars for
each hot dog, less one cent for each yard they must walk. Thus,
when all vendors charge the same price, the customers always
maximize their value by walking to the closest vendor, but they would
be willing to walk to any vendor who is as far as 100 yards away.
The 100-yard remote vendor produces value to the customer of
precisely the hot dog's price, and at that price no customer will walk
to a vendor who is 101 yards or farther away. The vendors are called
A, B, C, D…N.

In this setting a potential customer would be willing to purchase a
hot dog from as many as five vendors. For example, if she were
sunbathing precisely at the location of vendor D, then vendors C and
E would be 50 yards away in either direction, and vendors B and F
would be 100 yards away in either direction. Ordinarily the customer
would prefer to purchase from D, which gives her value of $2.00 for a
price of $1.00. Since she must walk 50 yards to either C or E, these
vendors give her value of $1.50 ($2.00 - 50 cents for 50 yards) for
$1.00; and vendors B and F give her value of $1.00 ($2.00 - $1.00
for 100 yards) for her $1.00, thus depriving her of all consumers'
surplus but nevertheless leaving her willing to purchase a hot dog.
Buccirossi, ed., MIT Press, 2008) (excellent, but quite technical, discussion); Michael
Baye, Market Definition and Unilateral Competitive Effects in Online Retail Markets, 4 J.
Comp. L. & Econ. 639 (2008); Jeffrey Church & Roger Ware, Industrial Organization: A
Strategic Approach §4.2 (2000); David T. Scheffman & Mary Coleman, Quantitative
Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects from a Merger (June 9, 2003, available at
www.ftc.gov); Thomas Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of
Nonfungible Goods, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1625 (1987).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359288
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Also observe that in this setting each of the firms has a range of “
captured” or preferred customers of 50 yards, or 25 yards on either
side, which is half-way to the next vendor. That is, a customer
located 20 yards to the left of vendor B would be 30 yards from
vendor A. Vendor B could charge that customer a price as much as
10 cents higher than vendor A could and still make the sale.
However, the vendors are unable to price-discriminate; they must
charge all hot dog buyers the same price. Furthermore, they are all
in the same position, 2 and in this “equilibrium” situation they all
charge a price of $1.00.
Suppose that vendors C and D should merge, while leaving their
stands (or “plants”) in the same location. The assumption that they
leave their stands in the same place is critical for now, but must be
relaxed later when we consider the possibility that firms will
reposition their offerings in response to the merger. In the example,
it should be clear that the two vendors together will be able to charge
a significantly higher price than when they were competing. For
example, considering the customers sunbathing between C and D,
the new firm CD has at least a 50-cent (50-yard) advantage over
vendors B and E, both of whom are at least 50 yards more remote.
Considering this group of customers alone, CD could increase its
price to $1.50 without losing any of them to either B or E.
Furthermore, the range of customers located between former C and
D is a full 50 yards, the same as the range of individual firms'
preferred customers before the merger. In sum, this merger would
very likely facilitate a significant price increase, perhaps by as much
as 30 or 40 cents.3
Furthermore, (1) this price increase could be assessed by firm
CD even though post-merger firm CD had a market share of only 8
percent or so (assuming 25 equal-size vendors prior to the merger
and that the beach itself was the smallest relevant market). Still
further, (2) although firm CD would be able to assess this significant
price increase, for the most part other firms in the market would not
be able to do so. The exception would be firms B and E, who are
adjacent to CD on each side. They may be able to respond to CD's
2

Actually, they are all in the same position except for the two vendors at the end
points, who have somewhat greater power because they face competition from only one
side rather than two.
3
The firm would probably not increase its price by 50 cents because it would lose too
many of the sales to customers located between B and CD on the left, and E and CD on the
right. Rather, it would compute a price increase that maximized net gains. Depending on
how customers were arrayed, this might be a price of, say, $1.30.
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price increase by increasing their own prices somewhat, although not
as much as CD.
Observe also that CD's ability to increase its price by these
magnitudes meets all the criteria for defining CD's output as a
relevant market unto itself. That is, the merger has put CD into a
position such that the elasticity of demand facing it is sufficiently low
that CD can reduce output and charge a price significantly above its
costs. For example, a cartel of C and D would achieve the same
result. We often define markets by considering the range of firms that
are capable of fixing prices. 4
Further, the significant increase in power occurs only because the
CD merger united two firms that were either adjacent or quite close
together in the beach/hot dog market. If two remote firms, such as A
and E, had merged, leaving three competitors between them, these
price effects would not occur. As we shall see later, unilateral effects
theories do not require that the output of the two merging firms be
the closest possible substitutes for one another. Nevertheless, they
must be regarded by customers as reasonably close substitutes.
While the story is somewhat more abstract when the firms are
spread out in product space rather than geographic space, the
principle is no different. The degree to which a merger in a productdifferentiated market might facilitate a unilateral price increase
depends on (1) the relative “closeness” in product space of the
merging firms to one another; (2) the relative distance between the
post-merger firm's product offering and the offerings of others in the
market; and (3) the relative inability of other firms to redesign their
products to make them close to the output of the merging firms.
Thus there must be a significant number of customers who
regard the products of the two merging firms as their preferred
market choices. 5 In Whole Foods the FTC and later the D.C. Circuit
distinguished between “marginal” customers, who would shop the
4

See 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶530a (3d ed. 2008)
(hereinafter “Antitrust Law”); and see Gregory J. Werden, the 1982 Merger Guidelines and
the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 71 Antitrust L.J. 253, 255-256, 262263(2003) (developing history and analytic defense of proposition that relevant market
consists of a “collusive group,” or smallest grouping of firms capable of colluding
profitably with one another). See also Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical
Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J.Comp. L. & Econ.
1031 (2008).
5
See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines §2.21. These Guidelines are reprinted in Appendix A of the Supplement.
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lowest price, and “core” customers who would be loyal to high end
natural food stores even after a price increase. 6 Whether the latter
group was significant enough to make a price increase profitable
presented an empirical question. The closer the products made by
the two merging firms, the more likely that the merger will produce a
substantial price increase. 7 Further, something must prevent other
firms in the market from repositioning their output to make it more
like that of the merging firms, thus enabling them to take advantage
of the price increase.
Figure B illustrates a unilateral effects merger in a productdifferentiated market. Suppose this market has six firms, A through
F, making a differentiated product. That is, the products of all six
firms compete with one another, but different customers prefer the
products of different firms. For some the preferences are strong; for
others they are weaker. Further, different customers have different
rankings of first, second, and third choices, and so on. Assume that
A's marginal cost is $1.00, its current price is $2.00, and at that price
it sells 100 units. Its residual price elasticity of demand is -2, which
means that a 10 percent price increase, to $2.20, will yield a 20
percent demand reduction, to 80 units. Note that this price increase
is unprofitable. Pre-increase profits were $100, but post-increase
profits are $1.20 per unit, times 80 units, or $96.

6
7

FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc. , 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at §2.211.
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But consider where the customers go when firm A raises its price.
Assume that of the 20 units that are lost, 8 (40%) go to B, the closest
rival, 5 (25%) go to C, the second closest rival, and 3, 3 and 1 units
respectively, go to rivals D, E and F. This percentage rate at which
customers substitute from A to B or from A to C, is called a “diversion
ratio.” 8 Assume also that all rivals have the same costs.
In this case an AC merger would make the price increase
profitable, even though C is not A’s “closest” rival. 9 While the price
increase to $2.20 reduces A's own profits by $4.00, it increases C's
profits by $5.00 (that is,C sells 5 more at a profit of $1.00 each). A
merger with B would be even more profitable, since 8 sales, and
$8.00 in increased profit, go to B. But the important point is that a
merger with either B or C would make A's 10 percent price increase
profitable, even though C is only the second closest rival. Thus either
merger would be challengeable if we regarded a merger facilitating a
10 percent price increase as unlawful.
Of course, a merger between A and C in the above situation
would almost certainly permit firm B to increase its prices as well,
given that it is an even closer substitute for A than C is. For
example, suppose that the automobile market contains three brands
8

See Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 347 (1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger
Analysis, 11 Antitrust 21(Spring 1997); Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated
Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring 1996); see also Christopher A. Vellturo, Evaluating
Mergers with Differentiated Products, 11 Antitrust 16 (Spring 1997). See also Gregory J.
Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries:
Structural Merger Policy and the Logit Model, 10 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407 (1994);
Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in
Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. Indus. Econ. 427 (1985). See also Gregory J.
Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects from Differentiated Products Mergers,
11 Antitrust 27 (Spring 1997); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic
Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 321 (1997).
9
See the Government’s Commentary:
A merger may produce significant unilateral effects even though a nonmerging product is the “closest” substitute for every merging product in the sense
that the largest diversion ratio for every product of the merged firm is to a nonmerging firm’s product. The unilateral effects of a merger of differentiated
consumer products are largely determined by the diversion ratios between pairs of
products combined by the merger, and the diversion ratios between those products
and the products of non-merging firms have at most a secondary effect.
Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines 28 (2006). Available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/
CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf
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of luxury cars that compete quite intensely among themselves for a
certain class of customers, and compete to a considerably lesser
degree with other automobiles. The three brands are Mercedes,
BMW, and Lexus. Of these, Mercedes and BMW are the closest
substitutes, which simply means that if Mercedes were to increase its
price unilaterally more of the customers who substituted away from
Mercedes would go to BMW than would go to Lexus. However, a
merger of Mercedes and Lexus could still effect a price increase.
But in that case BMW would operate under the price umbrella of its
nearest rival, which would be the newly merged Mercedes/Lexus
firm. Given the relative weakness of its competition with other
manufacturers it would almost certainly profit by increasing its own
prices as well. So ultimately this analysis differs very little from
saying that the grouping of sales covered by Mercedes, BMW and
Lexus constitutes a relevant market unto itself, and a merger of any
two firms within this market would very likely lead to the feared price
increase.
Significantly, these price increases might be profitable even if
rivals responded to the price increase by increasing their own output.
That is, we speak of the effects as “unilateral” because the
profitability of the merger does not depend on any notion that it
facilitates collusion by enabling nonmerging firms to reduce their own
output as well. All things being equal, the bigger the market share of
the post-merger firm vis-à-vis nonmerging firms, the more resistant it
will be to output increases by rivals. For this reason the theory is
most robust when the post-merger firm has a significant market
share, in the range of 35 percent or more. The Government’s
Commentary on the Merger Guidelines reveals that as an empirical
matter the Agencies’ unilateral effects challenges “nearly always
have involved combined shares greater than 35%.” 10 The
Commentary then adds:
Combined shares less than 35% may be sufficiently high to
produce a substantial unilateral anticompetitive effect if the
products are differentiated and the merging products are
especially close substitutes or if the product is undifferentiated
and the non-merging firms are capacity constrained. 11
Measuring diversion ratios is often a fairly matter of tracing
consumer substitution from electronic scanners or similar data. For
10

Id. at 26.
Ibid.

11
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example, if a sporting goods store sells several brands of running
shoes and the price of Adidas rises by 10 percent, scanner data
might reveal the number of customers who switched away from
Adidas, and the relative numbers that switched to Nike, Saucony,
Asics, and so on.
“Critical loss analysis” refers to the empirical determination
whether a price increase of a given magnitude is profitable by
comparing the gains from higher prices against the losses that result
from loss of volume. 12 For example, in a case such as Whole Foods
the question is whether after the merger the natural foods grocer
would be able to profit by increasing price substantially. 13 In
response to a price increase of a given magnitude a certain group of
loyal, or “core,” customers would pay more; other, more “marginal”
customers would abandon the Whole Foods chain in favor of more
general line grocery chains that were also increasingly carrying
natural foods items. If the increased profits that Whole Foods
increased from the loyal core group of customers was greater than
the revenue that it lost from the price sensitive marginal customers,
and if this price increase were of sufficient magnitude, then the price
increase would be profitable and the narrower market definition
appropriate. 14
12

See Barry Harris and Joseph Simmons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much
Substitution is Enough, 12 Res. L. & Econ. 207 (1989); Baniel P. O’Brien and Abraham L.
Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis (FTC Working Paper, May 23,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp254.pdf.
13
FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). On critical loss
analysis and the Whole Foods case, see Carlton Varner & Heather Cooper, Product
Markets in Merger Cases: The Whole Foods Decision, Antitrust Source (Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07-Varner.pdf; and Joseph
Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust Source (Feb. 2008),
available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/critical2008.pdf. See also Kevin
Murphy and Robert Topel, Critical Loss Analysis in the Whole Foods Case, Global
Competition Policy (March 17, 2008).
14
On the use of critical loss analysis to assess mergers, see Joseph Farrell and Carl
Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis, 2008 The Antitrust Source 1 (Feb. 2008),
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/02/Feb08-Farrell-Shapiro.pdf;
Malcolm B. Coate and Joseph J. Simons, Models, Mathematics and Critical Loss (FTC,
working
paper,
Feb.
18,
2009,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346067; Malcolm B. Coate and
Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market
Definition, 4 J.Comp. L. & Econ. 1031 (2008). For a good and balanced critique, see
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytic Overview, 74 Antitrust L. J. 129
(2007). Other good discussions include Daniel P. O'Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A
Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71 Antitrust L.J. 161 (2003); Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let's Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust 49 (Spring 2003);
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Critical loss analysis begins with a price increase of a given
magnitude, and then consider how many sales must be lost before
this particular price increase would become unprofitable. Then it
considers whether the actual level of sales lost in response to a
given price increase exceeds the critical level. 15 If the actual level is
greater than the critical level, then the price increase is unprofitable
and the market must be drawn more broadly. In some cases a large
price increase might be profitable while a smaller one would not be;
in others a small increase might be profitable while a larger one
would not be. 16 In most cases the merger in question has not
occurred. As a result the merger must be “simulated,” with the
relevant losses estimated from demand elasticities.
While simplified and artificial, the foregoing illustrations
nevertheless make an important point. In differentiated markets
mergers between firms making “adjacent” or similar product
variations can have a much more significant anticompetitive effect
than mergers between firms making more remote products. The
differentiations can apply to both spatial location, as in the hot dog
vendor illustration, and to product specification or design.
Critical loss analysis can yield the anomaly that it tends to
indicate larger markets (and thus less market power) when price/cost
margins are high. 17 In such cases the loss of relatively few
customers can be quite costly, indicating that fewer customer
James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers,
46 Antitrust Bull. 299 (2001); Dennis W. Carlton, Using Economics to Improve Antitrust
Policy, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283 (2004); Gregory J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss:
Tailoring Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 4 Competition L.J. 69
(2005); Kenneth L. Danger & H.E. Frech III, Critical Thinking About “Critical Loss” in
Antitrust, 46 Antitrust Bull. 339 (2001).
15
See City of New York v. Group Health, Inc., 2008 WL 4974578 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
2008) (critical loss analysis relevant to determination of amount of price increase that
would likely occur subsequent to a merger); Delco LLC v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 2007
WL 3307018 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2008) (similar).
16
See Gregory Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department’s Merger
Guidelines, 1983 Duke L.J. 514 (1983). Cf., e.g., California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130
F.Supp.2d 1109, 1129 (C.D.Cal. 2001) (erroneously concluding that the only relevant price
increase to be considered was the 5 percent increase suggested in the Guidelines; this could
lead to the perverse result that a merger would be exonerated because the post-merger
firm’s 5% price increase would be unprofitable, even though a 10% price increase would
be profitable). On the latter point, see Gregory J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: Tailoring
Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 4 Competition L.J. 69 (2005).
17
See, e.g., FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F.Supp.2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000) (ultimately
finding narrower market in case of high price/cost margins).
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substitutions are necessary to achieve the “critical” amount of loss. 18
But the other side is that margins might be high because the firms
are already charging monopoly prices, indicating that the market
should be defined narrowly. 19 In sum, a version of the “Cellophane
Fallacy” can be implicit in critical loss analysis, as it is in market
delineation under the Merger Guidelines generally. 20 That is, the
approach may reflect the fact that the firms are already charging a
profit-maximizing price that is significantly above their costs. Indeed,
if two firms that are very close to one another in product space are
behaving as a perfect cartel, which charges the same price as a
monopoly, then a merger of the two would not affect their price at all.
They would go right on charging the monopoly price. Nevertheless,
we would never permit such a merger because the two-person
(duopoly) situation is inherently less stable than the monopoly
situation, and later on proof of an unlawful agreement might be
established. As a result opportunities exist to apply the antitrust laws
to the two firm situation that will be lost once the merger has united
them into a single firm.
Although the price effects of such mergers are often said to be
“unilateral,” other firms in the market may be able to increase their
own prices as well. In the case of ordinary concentration increasing
mergers facilitating coordinated interaction, 21 we generally say that
every firm in the market experiences the resulting price increase,
whether or not the firm was involved in the merger. At the opposite
extreme—when a merger creates an absolute monopoly—the postmerger firm is the only one to enjoy the price increase. In this
intermediate case, the fact of product differentiation plus the product
or geographic proximity of the two merging firms means that they will
enjoy a significant price increase. But, depending on the situation,
some of the remaining firms may be able to increase their prices as
18

See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytic Overview, 74 Antitrust L. J.
129, 155-156 (2007).
19
See Daniel P. O'Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical
Loss Analysis, 71 Antitrust L.J. 161 (2003); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss:
Let's Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust, Spring 2003, at 49; James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li,
Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 46 Antitrust Bull. 299 (2001); Dennis W.
Carlton, Using Economics to Improve Antitrust Policy, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283
(2004).
20
On the Cellophane fallacy, see 2B Antitrust Law ¶539 (3d ed. 2008). See Gregory
J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: Tailoring Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist
Paradigm, 4 Competition L.J. 69 (2005), which also discusses other problems with the
critical loss technique.
21
See 4 Antitrust Law, Ch. 9B-2.
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well, although by a smaller amount. This is because, while their
products are relatively distinguishable from those of the merging
firms, the firms were nevertheless in the same market to begin with,
so the substitution rate among them is nevertheless significant. As a
result, a significant price increase by the post-merger firm reduces
competitive pressures on other firms as well, depending on their
degree of “ remoteness” from the post-merger firm's output. Thus, for
example, the post-merger firm might be able to increase its
priceby10 percent, while other firms in the market exact price
increases of, say, 1 to 3 percent, depending on how proximate their
output is to that of the post-merger firm. 22
In Evanston the FTC found that a previously consummated
merger among two hospitals substantially lessened competition
based largely on the fact that prices actually rose subsequent to the
merger. 23 The price increases were found to result from the unilateral
effect of limiting competition between two closely placed hospitals in
a diverse greater–Chicago market. The court rejected the proposition
that a unilateral effects theory could apply only if the merging firms
were the closest substitutes for the product in question, noting that a
merger between one firm and even its second- or third-closest
substitute could result in an unacceptable price increase. 24 This
would be tantamount to a conclusion that a relevant market exists for
the output of the two merging firms.25
In this case there was undisputed evidence that the post-merger
firm immediately raised prices subsequent to the merger, and the
Commission rejected the hospital's explanation that it did so only
because it had previously been ignorant about demand and had
undercharged certain classes of customers. The FTC accepted
regression analyses offered by its experts that related these price
increases to the structural effects of the merger rather than to
competitively “benign” factors.
In any event, measurement of diversion of customers seems
22

For example, in Figure B, supra, if firms A and C merged and increased their postmerger price, firm B would very likely then be able to increase its price as well, given that
its closest rival A was now charging a higher price.
23
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195 (F.T.C., Aug. 6, 2007)
(to the extent it is relevant, H.H. was consulted by the defendant).
24
Id., citing 4 Antitrust Law ¶914h (2d ed. 2004).
25
Id., citing Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Product
Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363,
384 & n.97 (1997).
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essential to the analysis. In Oracle the court observed that the
government had failed to produce evidence of customer diversion
ratios. 26 For its part, the government argued that the market was
characterized by a high degree of price discrimination, making such
numbers difficult to produce or meaningless when they were
produced. The court was not persuaded. It noted that without such
evidence there was insufficient proof of “localized competition”
between Oracle and Peoplesoft, the merging firms. 27 In sum, without
diversion ratio evidence one could not determine how much Oracle
and Peoplesoft competed with each other, nor, how little either of
these firms competed with some third firm. That argument seems
weighty in a situation where the basis for challenging the merger is
that the quantum of competition between the merging firms is high,
while that between the merging firms and other firms is low. At the
same time, however, the court erred in concluding that before the
government could prevail on its unilateral effects claim it had to
prove “a relevant market in which the merging parties would have
essentially a monopoly or dominant position….” 28 While a dominant
position is necessary for monopolization, the concern of merger law
is impermissible price increases, something which can be achieved
on far lower market shares.
Is market definition necessary?
A formal market definition is literally unnecessary to an
economist’s prediction whether a merger in a product differentiated
market will facilitate a unilateral price increase. Formulas can be
devised for predicting the impact of a post-merger price increase that
do not depend on a formal market definition. 29 At the same time, the
26

United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at 1117. See also United States v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F.Supp.2d 172
(D.D.C. 2001) (government’s market too narrowly drawn).
28
Id. at 1123.
29
See Carl Shapiro & Joseph Farrell, Mergers with Unilateral Effects: A Simpler and
More Accurate Alternative to Market Definition (FTC, Feb. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/docs/shapiro.pdf. The authors develop this formula for
assessing whether such a merger will result in upward pricing pressure:
27

D21 (P2 – C2) > ℮C1
Where,

D21 = the Diversion Ratio from Product 2 to Product 1
P2 = Pre-merger price of product 2
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case law seems quite clearly to require a market definition. 30
But these differences are more of rhetoric than of substance.
Economists often measure market power by looking at elasticities,
and use the term “relevant market” only because the legal policy so
requires. In a unilateral effects merger case the query is whether the
post-merger firm will be able to raise its price to an unacceptable
level (say, 5 percent to 10 percent above current prices or, in some
cases, above the competitive price) for an unacceptable period of
time. If that is the case then it clearly follows that a “grouping of
sales” exists in which such a price increase is plausible. That
grouping may consist of the two merging firms, or it may consist of
the two merging firms plus a few others that are reasonably adjacent
in product space. In all events, to speak of this post-merger
grouping as a “relevant market” is both sensible and quite
conventional within antitrust.
It may also be the case that the post-merger “relevant market” is
narrower than any observed pre-merger market. For example,
suppose we were to define a relevant market as a grouping of sales
for which a firm or firms could collectively and profitably hold price at
10 percent above cost. It is quite possible that firms B and D in a
field of A,B,C,D & E would not be able to sustain such a price as long
as they were competing with one another. As a result we would say
that the output of B and D does not constitute a relevant market, but
that perhaps the relevant market includes all five firms.31 After the
merger, however, B and D are no longer constrained by one
another’s prices and the feared price increase may be possible. At
that point it would become appropriate to say that the output of B and
D is itself a relevant market; or perhaps alternatively that the market
consists of the output of B, C & D, with C being a firm that is also
located very close to B and D in product space.
C2 = Marginal Cost of Product 2
C1 = Marginal cost of Product 1
℮ = credit for merger efficiencies
The formula requires knowledge of both the price and marginal cost of product 2,
a number which already provides considerable information about that product’s power.
30
See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548F.3d 1028, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
See also United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (requiring
proof of “a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market”); followed
in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
31
Although a cartel of B, C and D might still be able to raise prices to an unacceptable
level.
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This result is not inconsistent with the case law. For example,
Philadelphia Bank assessed this requirement:
Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market,
and results in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not
likely to have such anticompetitive effects.32
Clearly, the reference to a merger that “produces” a firm that controls
an “undue percentage share of the relevant market” is a reference to
the situation that exists subsequent to the merger. Quite consistently
with Philadelphia Bank, one can conclude the merger facilitated an
unacceptable price increase among a narrower grouping of firms,
which is therefore appropriately described as a relevant market.
For the time being at least, the courts remain insistent on a
market definition in a merger case and the quoted language from
Philadelphia Bank appears to restrain the lower courts from doing
otherwise. But the concept of a relevant market is surely flexible
enough to permit the courts to identify a “relevant market” while
economists use their own tools of measurement to predict whether a
merger will yield an unacceptable price increase above marginal
cost. As Landes and Posner observed already in 1981 the concept
of a relevant market for all forms of antitrust analysis, including
mergers, is entirely dependent on the elasticities of supply and
demand that a firm faces. 33 A unilateral effects merger that yields an
32

Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 937, 962 (1981):
… market definition is important in determining whether a firm has market
power (and how much it has) only because of the difficulty of measuring
elasticities of demand and supply reliably. If we knew the elasticity of demand
facing firm i, we could measure its market power directly … without troubling
ourselves about what its market share was. Less obviously, if we could readily
determine market elasticities of demand (but not firm elasticities of demand), we
would not have to worry about how broadly or narrowly the market was
defined…. If the market were defined broadly--that is, if distant as well as close
substitutes for firm i's product were included in the market--i's market share would
tend to be small, but the market elasticity of demand would also tend to be low; so
many substitutes would be included in the market that consumers would have
difficulty substituting away from the market if market price rose…. If instead the
market were defined narrowly, the firm's market share would be larger but the
effect on market power would be offset by the higher market elasticity of
33
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unacceptable price increase is simply a merger that reduces the
relevant elasticities facing the merging firm, thus permitting a
narrower market definition. 34
Indeed, one characteristic of unilateral effects merger cases in
product differentiated markets is that the market boundaries
themselves tend to be both uncertain and shifting. The historical
conception of a relevant market involved a grouping of firms that
produced the “same” product, which was distinguishable from other
firms that produced a “different” product.” Product differentiation
necessarily entails that competition among different firms within such
a market is imperfect, and the degree of imperfection varies from one
pair of firms to another. Whether a yet further differentiated firm is
inside or outside the market is entirely a matter of definition. The
problem is exacerbated by the fact that not only is the output of the
firms differentiated, but both the product and the firms themselves
may be subject to rapid technological change. 35 To the extent that
firms continuously seek to differentiate their products these
boundaries shift as a firm move closer to or further away from the
product space of another firm.
The Oracle court noted the great difficulty in defining relevant
markets when there are gradations of substitutability between
different firms, and the only difference between the substitutability of
the products of the merging firms and that between the merging firms
and outsiders is a relatively narrow one of degree. The Court then
suggested “that strong presumptions based on mere market
concentration may be ill-advised in differentiated products unilateral
effects cases.” 36

demand….
This conception may revitalize a conception of “submarket,” but the two concepts
are completely different and revitalization would lead to confusion. See 2B Antitrust Law
¶533 (3d ed. 2008). See also Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: in
Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 Antitrust L.J. 203 (2000).
35
Michael L. Katz and Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 Antitrust
L.J. 1, 32-33 (2007); see also Michael L. Katz and Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis
and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should we Expect Better, 74 Antitrust L.J. 537 (2007).
36
Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 citing Roscoe B Starek III & Stephen Stockum,
What Makes Mergers Anticompetitive?: “Unilateral Effects” Analysis Under the 1992
Merger Guidelines, 63 Antitrust L.J. 801, 804 (1995); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K.
Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321, 337-339 (1997); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The
Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Structural Merger Policy and the
Logit Model, 10 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407, 413 (1994).
34
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And given these constraints the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in
Whole Foods seems to be about right -- faithful to both the
economists’ analysis and also to the legal reality of Philadelphia
Bank’s mandate that a relevant market must be identified in a merger
case. 37 The court rejected the FTC’s claim that a relevant market
was unnecessary, but it recognized a plausible the claim that a
narrower market for premium natural and organic supermarkets
(PNOS), in which the merging firms were dominant. The court
unfortunately also used the term “submarket,” 38 but this usage was
unnecessary to its analysis, because it concluded that the smaller
market existed on the basis of traditional price increasing criteria that
are used to identify relevant markets.

Anticompetitive effects dissipated by easy competitor mobility
The competitive effects of merger of hot dog vendors in the
previous illustrations would quickly be dissipated if individual hot dog
vendors could cheaply and quickly relocate their stands—for
example, if all were mobile carts that could be moved at the vendor's
will. In that case, when firms C and D merged and attempted a price
increase of, say, 30 percent, we would expect firms A, B, E, F and
perhaps others to move their carts closer into the CD territory in
order to participate in these price increases. The effect would be to
drive the prices back down toward the $1 level. The same thing
could happen in the case of the merger in the product-differentiated
market depending on how easily nonmerging firms could reconfigure
their products to make them more closely resemble the merging
firms' product. In sum, the threat of such a merger to produce
anticompetitive results depends on the inability of other firms to
respond by innovating or relocating into that portion of the market
that has now become more competitive as a result of the merger. As
the Oracle court put it:
repositioning by the non-merging firms must be
unlikely. In other words, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the non-merging firms are
unlikely to introduce products sufficiently similar
37

FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1039 (“The FTC's evidence delineated a PNOS submarket catering to a core
group of customers who ‘have decided that natural and organic is important, lifestyle of
health and ecological sustainability is important,’” quoting the district court, 502 F.Supp.2d
at 23).
38
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to the products controlled by the merging firms to
eliminate any significant market power created
by the merger. 39
By contrast, in Whole Foods the FTC cited evidence that
repositioning by conventional grocers to compete more
closely with natural food stores would be difficult because
by moving their offerings in this direction they would have
to weaken their position vis-à-vis their core customers.40
The district court disagreed, and found significant
repositioning. 41 The D.C. Circuit cited this evidence as
well, but did not find it conclusive. 42

Merger to Monopoly? Early Railroad Merger Cases

Is the merger of hot dog vendors illustrated previously any
different from a conventional merger to monopoly? That question is
largely one of market definition, as some of the early merger cases
illustrate. For example Union Pacific was a government challenge to
Union Pacific's acquisition of Southern Pacific, two large,
predominantly east-west railroad systems that were adjacent to each
other and that previously had competed along many routes.43 As the
39

Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. See also id. at 1109:
assuming that localized product or geographic competition exists between Oracle and
PeopleSoft, plaintiffs have not proved that SAP, Microsoft and Lawson would not be
able to reposition themselves in the market so as to constrain an anticompetitive price
increase or reduction in output by a post-merger Oracle.
And see id. at 1135 (similar). Likewise, in FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc. , 548 F.3d
1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008), a price increase by the post-merger firm would naturally induce the
general grocery chains to reposition their own inventory so as to compete more closely
with the natural food stores, where margins were higher; their ability to do so in a
reasonable amount of time could be decisive in determining whether the merger would lead
to an unacceptable price increase. On the repositioning issue generally, see Yves
Botteman, Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence, 2 J.Competition L.
& Econ. 71 (2006); John Harkrider, Proving Anticompetitive Impact: Moving Past Merger
Guidelines Presumptions, 2005 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 317, 325 (2005).
40
The evidence is summaried in Deborah L. Feinstein and Michael B. Bernstein, All
Over the Map: Grocery Store Enforcement from Von’s to Whole Foods, 22 Antitrust 52, 55
(Fall, 2007).
41
See F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 502 F.Supp.2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2008).
42
548 F.3d at 1035.
43
United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); see also United States
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Supreme Court noted, although there were alternatives for carrying
railroad traffic from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast, the
merger of these two railroads eliminated much of the closest
competition. 44
One way to view such a case is to see the geographic area
covered by the Union Pacific and the Southern Pacific as a relevant
market, and the merger as eliminating all competition between the
only two participants in that market. Although modern market
definition criteria had not yet been developed, this is apparently the
perspective that the Court took. But in fact there were numerous
competing lines, and the amount of competition varied depending on
the origin and destination of the freight in question. What made the
mergers anticompetitive is that they involved adjacent systems in the
network, and the merger thus had the effect of isolating relatively
more shipments from the competition of other lines. This was
clearest in the Southern Pacific case. As the Court explained, when
routing traffic originating on its lines the Southern Pacific—
presumably acting as most railroads would—attempted to keep the
traffic completely on its own line rather than transferring to the line of
another railroad. 45 One of the lines it was most often forced to share
was controlled by the Central Pacific. By acquiring the Central Pacific
Southern Pacific was thus able to make a higher percentage of its
lines noncompetitive.
Thus today we might look at the great railroad system merger
cases as mergers in product-differentiated markets, with the
differentiation resting entirely on geographic location. While the
competing systems had many common points of interconnection and
large cities were served by numerous systems, more isolated areas
were typically served by a single system or perhaps two systems. As
a result, competition ranged from fairly intense for long-haul rates
between pairs of large cities, to almost nonexistent for short hauls
between two relatively small towns.46 While modern market definition
criteria might permit finding many individual routes to be relevant
markets, the systems themselves might be found to be in significant
competition with each other. But the merger of “adjacent” systems
v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197 (1904).
44
Union Pacific, 226 U.S. at 88-89.
45
Southern Pacific, 259 U.S. at 231.
46
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century system is described in more detail in
Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017-1072 (1988).
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would have the effect of significantly reducing the amount of
competition along numerous routes—thus increasing the number of
routes on which monopoly price increases would not be disciplined
by competition.

Relative incidence of unilateral effects
As the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines47 observe, product
differentiation can make collusion or oligopoly far more difficult than it
would be in a market where every firm's product was identical with
everyone else's.48 As a result, collusion is of relatively less concern
in markets that are characterized by significant product
differentiation.
By “significant,” we mean product differentiation that goes to fairly
fundamental differences in product design, manufacturing costs,
technology, or use of inputs. 49 While many markets exhibit some
degree of product differentiation, not all product differentiation is
significant. For example, today even agricultural products are subject
to branding, such as Chiquita and Del Monte bananas. Other
products, such as ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, seem far more
different on first appearance than they are in fact. While Kellogg's
Frosted Flakes and Post's Alphabits might appear quite distinct, they
are in fact made with common ingredients and common technology,
with equipment that can be reconfigured to extrude different shapes
or designs. And, of course, they are promoted differently. But leaving
aside intellectual property rights, a firm making one could quite easily
switch its production facilities to the manufacturing of the other. To
this extent, costs are more or less the same, and collusion might be
quite possible.
When product differentiation is significant, therefore, collusion
becomes less likely, but mergers effecting unilateral price increases
in specific segments of the product-differentiated market become

47

Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines §2.21 (reprinted in Appendix A of the Supplement).
48
On the impact of production differentiation on collusion, see 12 Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2002f2 (2d ed. 2005).
49
See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (“Merely demonstrating that the merging
parties' products are differentiated is not sufficient. Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate
product differentiation sufficient to sustain a small but significant and non-transitory price
increase.”).
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relatively more likely. 50
Robustness; Conceptual Difficulties
Analysis of unilateral effects in merger cases seems rather new,
although the discussion of the early railroad merger cases indicates
that at least some of the issues have been around for some time. In
any event, this novelty should not be interpreted to mean that
unilateral effects analysis is more speculative or less provable using
econometric methodologies than other types of anticompetitive
effects. Indeed, in a great many cases unilateral effects may be more
readily capable of proof than is the likelihood of collusion, 51 although
the robustness of the conclusions depend critically on the availability
50

Cf. State of New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 352-358
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), concluding that a merger of two ready-to-eat breakfast cereal
manufacturers was unlikely to produce anticompetitive unilateral effects. The court noted
mainly that the participants' Grape-Nuts and Shredded Wheat appealed to somewhat
different groups of consumers, had been developed through different types of advertising
campaigns, and had significant physical dissimilarities and different pricing structures. The
Court then suggested that one could not easily or effectively supplant the other in the
ready-to-eat cereal market. As a result, the evidence did not support the plaintiff's
contention that Grape-Nuts and Shredded Wheat are the first and second choices of a
significant percentage of cereal consumers.
See also United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D.D.C. 1993):
[T]he evidence indicates that the market is awash with
manufacturers and that the merger is unlikely to give the merged
company the ability—unilaterally or collusively—to create anticompetitive effects. … First, there is ample evidence that the
merged company will not be able to increase prices on premium
fountain pens unilaterally: There is ample evidence that fountain
pens compete with other modes of writing. … [A]n increase in
one type of pen will make it relatively less attractive than other
types of pen. … In addition, given the competition between
fountain pens and other modes of writing and the ease with
which manufacturers may enter this wider market, Gillette will
not be able to raise prices unilaterally on its premium fountain
pens.
51
See Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 347 (1997); Christopher A. Vellturo, Evaluating Mergers with Differentiated
Products, 11 Antitrust 16 (Spring 1997). As Vellturo notes, often the data necessary to
estimate the “ diversion ratio,” or the extent to which customers respond to a price increase
in product A by switching to product B, are more readily obtained than the data necessary
to measure a relevant market and compute overall demand effects. To that extent such
analysis can be more reliable than traditional market concentration analysis. For more
technical discussions, see Werden & Froeb, 10 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407; Baker &
Bresnahan, 33 J. Indus. Econ.427; Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects, 11
Antitrust 27.
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of data. 52
Oligopoly theories are largely familiar to federal judges and
antitrust lawyers, and they have been widely used in merger analysis
for many years. But this familiarity belies their complexity and the
many assumptions that attend any prediction of the price effects of a
particular market structure. The pure theory, while elegant, depends
on many simplifying assumptions53 that rarely apply in real-world
situations. As a result, empirical analysis by economists consists in
large part of controlling for deviations. Thus, for example, the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines consider numerous factors that can
vary the significance of a particular concentration level. 54 While
stating these factors is relatively easy, assigning weights to them and
measuring their impact on the firms' collective ability to increase
price can be extremely difficult. Further, as any economist knows, a
“market share” is a relatively meaningless number unless
accompanied by information concerning the cross-elasticities of
demand and supply that the firms in the resulting market face. 55
However, the market definition/market share computation process
that goes on in the typical antitrust case involves defining a market
using fairly rough criteria and then treating all market share numbers
of similar magnitude as meaning about the same thing.
As a result, the predictions that the Merger Guidelines enable us
to make on the basis of market share are often imprecise, providing
relatively clear indications of anticompetitive effects in cases that are
significantly over the thresholds, but less clear indications about
marginal cases. Nevertheless, the case law has been willing to
accommodate this uncertainty, and the language of Clayton Act §7
seems to accept it. The statute does not require sure proof of price
increases of a given magnitude; rather, it requires only reasonable
evidence showing that the effect of a merger “may be” substantially
to “lessen competition.”
Applying these same criteria, measurement of unilateral effects
52

See Hausman & Leonard, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321.
Briefly: perfectly fungible product, perfect information about the output of rivals,
constant costs, no strategic behavior other than the immediate search for the output level at
which marginal cost and marginal revenue are equal.
54
1992 Merger Guidelines §2.11 (reprinted in Appendix A of the Supplement).
55
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981). Making the point forcefully in the defense of alternative
econometric methodologies in unilateral effects merger cases is the Jerry A. Hausman &
Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real
World Data, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321 (1997).
53
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with modern econometric tools is very likely no less speculative and
probably more manageable when appropriate data are available. 56
Predicting behavior may be a more manageable exercise because
fewer firms have to be taken into account. In the ordinary collusion
facilitation case one must at least theoretically anticipate the
behavior of every firm in the post-merger market. In the typical
unilateral effects case, by contrast, the concern is with the behavior
of the merger participants plus the relative position and capacity of
“adjacent” firms.
Needless to say, however, the methodologies are technical and
require the use of an expert trained in empirical economic analysis.
At the same time, unilateral effects merger theories face some
significant difficulties. 57 One problem in estimating unilateral effects
is that retail pricing data used alone can exaggerate the
anticompetitive effects of mergers by focusing exclusively on the
demand side of the market. 58 Suppose Beech-Nut and Gerber are
relatively close substitutes making “premium” baby food and decide
to merge. Scanner data indicates that these firms are close
substitutes for each other but that Heinz, which makes a lower-priced
brand, is more removed. As a result, the data suggest that a price
increase will result from the Beech-Nut and Gerber merger. But the
scanner data provide information only about customers' immediate
responses to price variations among the three brands. The data say
nothing about whether Heinz would be in a position to modify its
product so as to compete in the premium market niche itself. Nor do
they say anything about grocers' ability to respond to a price
increase in premium baby food by reallocating more shelf space to
lower-priced brands. Excessive reliance on short-run consumer
behavior undoubtedly provides an exaggerated picture to the extent
that consumer choice is only one of many avenues along which
substitution among products occurs.59 Before consumer data tell us
56

See especially Carl Shapiro & Joseph Farrell, Mergers with Unilateral Effects: A
Simpler and More Accurate Alternative to Market Definition (FTC, Feb. 12, 2008),
Jonathan Baker,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/docs/shapiro.pdf;
Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 347, noting that direct
measure of demand elasticities is often a more reliable mechanism for assessing power than
assessments of relevant market and market share.
57
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, ch. 9
(2005). See also Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1098, which noted many difficulties.
58
This is can be the case of critical loss analysis, which tends to focus on consumer
behavior rather than supplier substitution.
59
See Edward J. Lopez, New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique, 20 Cato J. #3(Winter
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reliably that a merger between two makers of similar products is
anticompetitive, we also need to have fairly reliable information about
how other firms in the market are likely to respond to the market
shifts caused by the merger. 60
A second problem with unilateral effects theories is more
conceptual. The theory postulates a single relevant market that
under the Merger Guidelines must be well defined. This means that
the goods in it must be reasonably good substitutes for each other.
The unilateral effects theory then postulates that the output of the
two merging firms is particularly close, while the output of
nonmerging firms is sufficiently distinct that they cannot discipline a
higher price charged by the merging firms. Returning to the previous
example of a market containing firms A through F and a merger
between C and D, why is it that firms A, B, E, and F are unable to
respond to the CD price increase? If they cannot make such a
response, then it seems reasonable to conclude that they were
improperly included in this market to begin with. But if the market
was really limited to firms C and D, then we have a simple merger to
monopoly, which does not require any “unilateral effects” theory to
analyze. 61
Criteria for Identifying Likelihood of Unilateral Price Increase
A merger in a product-differentiated market is more likely to result
in a unilateral price increase as:
(1) the products of the two merger participants are relatively
similar to one another;
(2) the products of the two merger participants are more
different from the products produced by most other firms in
the market that are not participating in the merger,
although one or two may be equally or more similar; and
(3) nonparticipants are unable readily to alter or reconfigure
their products to make them more nearly like the products
of the merger participants.
To the extent that such a merger enables the post-merger firm
profitably to assess a significant price increase without losing sales
2001).
60

On this point, see Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still
Hostile After All These Years, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 729, 739-740 (1999).
61
On mergers to monopoly, see 4 Antitrust Law ¶911 (3d ed. 2009).
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to other firms, we would say that the merger facilitates the
emergence of a new grouping of sales, or relevant market, in which
the merging firms have either a monopoly or else a dominant
share. 62
In assessing the first criterion with respect to any merger, we
might ask whether the two merging firms produce any products that
would be the first and second choices of consumers in that market,
considering pre-merger prices. 63 Thus, for example, suppose the
merging firms both manufacture differentiated product A, whose
variations are expressed as A1, A2, A3, A4, … An. In this case, let
us suppose that the acquiring firm produces variation A2 and the
acquired firm produces a fairly close variation, A3. Further, for a
significant group of consumers A2 is the first choice at pre-merger
prices, while A3 would be the second choice. The competition
between the manufacturers of A2 and A3 can be said to be more
intense for the patronage of these customers than the competition
between the makers of such pairings as A2 and A6, or A3 and A1.
Suppose the econometric evidence indicates that a 10 percent
pre-merger price increase in A2 would have been unprofitable
because a significant number of A2's customers would have
substituted A3—that is, the diversion ratio between A2 and A3 is
high. 64 After the merger, however, a 10 percent price increase in
combined A2/A3 would be undermined only by substitutions of third
or fourth choices, such as A1 or A4. If the relative difference in
consumer preferences for A1 or A4 is significantly greater than the
62

Accord, Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (citing this paragraph in the previous
edition).
63
See Shapiro, 10 Antitrust at 24.
64
The diversion ratio expresses the extent to which buyers of the acquiring firm will
substitute the good of the acquired firm, or vice versa, not the degree of substitution
generally, which is the same as cross-price elasticity of demand. For an empirical critique,
see Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated
Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 Geo. Mason J. Rev. 321 (1997).
To illustrate, suppose that the evidence indicates that in response to a 10 percent price
increase, 60 percent of the customers of A2 will substitute away, but they will go in roughly
equal numbers to A1, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 and A8. In that case it is clear that the
manufacturers of all of these variations are in close competition with A2 and eliminating A3
as a rival will still leave all the others, suggesting that a significant price increase would
still be unprofitable.
By contrast, if the evidence suggests that in response to A2's 10 percent price increase
60 percent of the customers would substitute away but two-thirds of these would purchase
A3, then the A2/A3 merger would eliminate this option for these customers, who might then
pay the higher price rather than substitute to A1, A4, or others.
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relative difference between A2 and A3 had been, then this combined
10 percent price increase in A2/A3 could be quite profitable, even
though the increase in A2 alone would not have been. As suggested
earlier, that conclusion could be expressed in conventional antitrust
terms by saying that the post-merger grouping A2/A3 is a relevant
market that the post-merger firm now dominates, although the
sufficiently similar output of other firms must be included as well.
Significantly, a cartel of A2 and A3 would also have been profitable.
At this point, however, we can expect that the manufacturers of
A1 and A4, and perhaps others, will try to compete for the higher
profit sales made by the newly merged A2/A3 firm. If these
manufacturers are like the mobile hot dog vendors in the previous
illustration, then the post-merger price increase will not last very
long. A1,A4, and perhaps other firms will immediately produce a
product variation sufficiently resembling the A2/A3 variations that
customers would rather purchase than pay the higher price. 65
Interstate Bakers approved a consent decree requiring the
merging wholesale bakers, Interstate and Continental, to divest
certain brand labels.66 As the court described the allegations:
The Complaint alleges that Interstate's
acquisition of Continental would likely lead to an
increase in price charged to consumers for white
pan bread. Following the acquisition, Interstate
likely would unilaterally raise the price of its own
brands. … Because Interstate and Continental's
brands are perceived by consumers as close
substitutes, Interstate could pursue such a
pricing strategy without losing so much in sales
to competing white pan bread brands or to
private labels that the price increase would be
unprofitable. Interstate could, for instance,
profitably impose a significant increase in the
price of Wonder white pan bread, since a
substantial portion of any sales lost for that
product would be recaptured by increased sales
of Interstate's other brands.
Since many consumers consider Interstate
65
66

1995).

See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1109, 1118 (noting this to be the case).
United States v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,271 (N.D. Ill.
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and Continental brands to be closer substitutes
than most other branded or private label white
breads, the competitive discipline provided by
rivals after the acquisition would be insufficient to
prevent Interstate from significantly increasing
the prices now being charged for Interstate and
Continental branded white pan bread. Moreover,
in response to Interstate's price increases,
competing bakers would likely increase their
prices of white pan bread. 67
Finally, the efficiencies defense elaborated in Subchapter 9E
applies here as fully as in other types of merger cases.

Government Guidelines
In determining whether to challenge mergers under this unilateral
effects theory, the Merger Guidelines state that the enforcement
agency will consider several factors. First, “Substantial unilateral
price elevation in a market for differentiated products requires that
there be a significant share of sales in the market accounted for by
consumers who regard the products of the merging firms as their first
and second choices, and that repositioning of the non-parties'
product lines to replace the localized competition lost through the
merger be unlikely.” 68
Second, “The price rise will be greater the closer substitutes are
to the products of the merging firms, i.e., the more the buyers of one
product consider the other product to be their next choice.”69
Third, although the general market concentration thresholds for
challenging horizontal mergers do not apply so readily under this
67

Id. at 76,190. Cf. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. ¶71,405
(N.D. Tex. 1995) a judgment on a consent decree terminating a challenge to a merger that
included two out of three major manufacturers of facial tissue. The acquiring firm,
Kimberly-Clark, produced Kleenex, which dominated the market with a 48.5 percent share
and was a lower-priced tissue. The acquired firm, Scott, produced Scotties, which had only
a 7 percent share but was also aggressively priced, forcing Kleenex to be priced lower than
it otherwise would be. Under the decree Kimberly-Clark agreed to divest the Scotties'
brand and two out of four tissue mills.
68
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §2.21. See Malcolm B. Coate, Unilateral
Effects under the Guidelines: Models, Merits, and Merger Policy (FTC working paper, Oct.
1, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263474
69
Guidelines, §2.211.
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theory, as a rough generalization mergers will be subject to
challenge where they fall outside the “safe harbor” provisions of
those thresholds70 and the market share of the merger participants
exceeds 35 percent. This latter figure, it is noted, may overstate or
understate the competitive significance of the merger, depending on
the degree of similarity in the products of the two merging firms and
their joint similarity to the products of others.
Fourth, as it is more difficult and costly for nonparticipants to the
merger in the product-differentiated market to reconfigure their
products so as to compete more directly with the post-merger firm,
the competitive effects of the merger increase and challenge is more
likely. 71
Economics of Unilateral Effects
While mergers between rival sellers can increase the likelihood of
collusive behavior, they can also make it profitable for the merging
firms to raise their prices without relying on a similar response by
other firms in the market. This is particularly true in oligopolistic
markets. Although the firms continue to choose their outputs and/or
prices independently, the combination of two or more firms into one
eliminates the constraints that each of the merging firms imposed on
the others' choices, and the new equilibrium can deviate (further)
from the competitive outcome. The extent to which these unilateral
effects are likely to occur depends on the nature of the interaction
among the firms in the market (including the behavior of potential
entrants), the degree of substitutability among the firms' products
and the relation between costs and outputs for the firms. While the
post-merger firm may not depend on the responses of others in
increasing its own price, close rivals may be in a position to take
advantage of the post-merger firm’s price increase, either to (1)
increase their own prices; or (2) reposition their product so as to
bring it closer to the product of the post-merger firm, where margins
are now higher.
A common version of unilateral effects, the localized competition

70

This would be: (a) where the post-merger HHI is in the range 1000-1800 and the
HHI increase resulting from the merger exceeds 100; or (b) where the post-merger HHI
exceeds 1800 and the increase in HHI caused by the merger exceeds 50. See 1992
Guidelines §1.51. For the HHI, its computation, and the general Guidelines thresholds, see
4 Antitrust Law ¶¶930-932 (3d ed. 2009).
71
1992 Guidelines §2.
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theory that is set forth in the 1992 Merger Guidelines,72 can be seen
in the following example. 73 Suppose that Firm A and Firm B each sell
a single brand in a differentiated product market. In the initial premerger equilibrium, Firm A sells 100 units at a price of $2 per unit
and faces a demand curve for its output with an elasticity of -2. Thus,
a 10 percent increase in the price that Firm A charges would lead to
a 20 percent reduction in the quantity that Firm A sells. Some of
these lost sales would result from consumers switching to other
brands of the product (including the brand offered by Firm B), while
other lost sales would result from consumers buying other goods
altogether. If the constant marginal cost of production for Firm A is
$1 per unit, a 10 percent price increase would not be profitable; it
would lead to increased profits (or contribution to fixed costs) of
$0.20 on the 80 units that it would continue to sell, or $16, but at a
cost of $1.00 profit on each of the 20 units that are no longer
purchased, or $20. Alternatively, Firm A would earn a profit of $96 by
selling 80 units at a markup of $1.20, as opposed to the $100 profit it
would earn by selling 100 units at the original $1 markup.
To see how a merger between Firm A and Firm B could change
this situation, suppose that 25 percent of the sales that Firm A would
lose as a result of the 10 percent price increase would be captured
by Firm B as consumers switch to alternative brands, and that Firm B
is also selling its output at a $1 markup over marginal cost. If Firm A
acquires Firm B, the profits that the merged firm earns on the five
units diverted from A's brand to B's brand are no longer lost when
the price of Firm A's brand is increased, and the $0.20 price increase
is now profitable. Against the $20 loss of profits from reduced sales
of brand A, the merged firm gains $16 on the 80 units of brand A that
it continues to sell plus an additional $5 on the increased sales of
brand B, for a total of $21.
Before the merger, Firm A's price was constrained by the ability
of consumers to switch to other goods, including Firm B's product,
and the constraint imposed by the latter is removed as a result of the
merger. Similarly, Firm A's constraint on Firm B's pricing is also
eliminated as a result of the merger, and we would want to consider
the possibility that the merged firm would now be in a position to
72

Id., §2.21.
Similar examples are presented in Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated
Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring 1996); Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical
Merger Analysis, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 347 (1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral
Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 Antitrust 21(Spring 1997).
73
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raise the price of brand B. This would depend on the willingness of
consumers to switch to other products in response to an increase in
brand B's price and the extent to which those sales would go to
brand A. The analysis of the proposed merger should not stop with
the demand side either. Subsequent steps should include an inquiry
into the ability and willingness of other nonmerging producers to
respond to the price increase by changing their prices or promotion
activities, repositioning their brands to make them closer substitutes,
or by entering new brands. Any of these responses could lead to an
increase in the number of consumers who switch from brand A and
may make the post-merger price increase unprofitable.
Accommodating responses by rivals, on the other hand, would tend
to make the post-merger price increase larger. Cost savings that
arise as a result of the merger may also reduce the incentive to raise
price, and if sufficiently large could actually lead to price
decreases.74
Note that Firm B need not be the “closest” substitute for Firm A,
in the sense that more consumers switch to Firm B than to any other
firm in response to an increase in the price of Firm A's brand. Even if
50 percent of the sales that Firm A would lose as a result of the 10
percent price increase would be captured by Firm C, the merger
between Firms A and B would still make a unilateral price increase
profitable. All the analysis requires is that a significant fraction of the
lost sales be diverted to brand B; if only 10 percent of the lost sales
(two units) are diverted, the additional $2 of profit on the increased
sales of brand B is not sufficient to make the 10 percent price
increase profitable for the merged firm.
Note also the importance of the markup (the difference between
price and marginal cost) for Firm B to the calculation. If the markup
for Firm B were only $0.50, say because Firm B has higher costs,
the additional profit to the merged firm on sales to consumers
switching from brand A to brand B is only $2.50 ($0.50 times 5 units),
which is no longer sufficient to make the price increase profitable.
Conversely, if the markup on Firm B's output were $1.50, the merger
would make the 10 percent price increase profitable if only 20
percent (four units) of the lost sales of brand A were diverted to
brand B. One troublesome result of this analysis is that, just as the
Merger Guidelines generally, the methodology tends to find larger
markets as prices are higher in relation to cost, thus leading to the
74

1996).

See Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring
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claim that the methodologies we use to assess mergers commit a
version of the “Cellophane” fallacy. 75
The critical factors in the demand side of this analysis are the
own-price elasticity of demand for Firm A's brand, which determines
the sales of brand A that will be lost in response to a price increase,
and the fraction of those lost sales that will be captured by Firm B.
The latter has been termed the Diversion Ratio; it is related to the
cross-price elasticity of demand for brand A with respect to the price
of brand B, to the own-price elasticity of demand for brand A, and to
the pre-merger sales of both brands.76 In one set of circumstances,
the Diversion Ratio is related to the shares of the two firms;
specifically, if N percent of sales that are lost by Firm A result from
consumers switching brands (with 100 - N percent resulting from
purchases of goods outside the market) and if all brands are equally
“close” or “ distant” to each other, 77 the Diversion Ratio between
brands A and B reduces to (0.01 × N × S B)/(1 - S A), where SA and
SB are the shares of brands A and B, respectively. 78 More generally,
however, other evidence, including statistical estimates of the
demand elasticities will be required.
Unilateral Effects Facilitated by Capacity Constraints or
Differential Costs
Introduction
A merger can also facilitate unilateral price increases in the
75

The “Cellophane” fallacy consist in concluding that a firm lacks monopoly power
because it would lose too many sales in response to a given price increase, when cross
elasticity of demand is in fact high because the firm is already charging a monopoly price.
See 2B Antitrust Law ¶533 (3d ed. 2007).
76
See Carl Shapiro,Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring
1996); and Robert Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger
Guidelines, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 281 (1991).
77
The assumption that all brands are equally close underlies the so-called “logit”
model used to simulate the effect of mergers. See Werden & Froeb, The Effects of Mergers
in Differentiated Prodcuts Industries: Sturctural Merger Policy and the Logit Model, 10
J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407 (1994).
78
Thus, if 75 percent of sales that are lost by Firm Aresult from consumers switching
brands and 25 percent result from consumers switching to goods outside the market, all
brands are equally “close” or “distant” to each other, and the shares of brands A and B are
20 and 25 percent, respectively. The Diversion Ratio between brands A and B would be
(.75)(.25)/(1-.20) ≈ .23; approximately 23 percent of the sales lost by brand A would be
diverted to brand B.
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special situation where (1) nonmerging firms in the market cannot
readily increase their output except at significantly higher cost; and
(2) the merger places the post-merger firm in a unique position to
make “all or nothing” offers to a relatively small group of large
buyers. Theoretically this theory can apply to a merger in an
undifferentiated market – that is, where all sellers make an identical
product.
Consider this example: a market contains several relatively small
sellers who cannot readily increase their output; as a result, buyers
must typically obtain their needs by purchasing from two or more
sellers. Suppose, for example, that the selling market has eight firms
producing 100 units each. Four of the firms have costs of $5 per unit
and another four firms have costs of $6 per unit. But a large buyer
needs 300 units, which it could generally obtain before the merger
for $5 per unit by forcing the four lower-cost firms to bid against each
other. But now suppose that any two of the four lower-cost firms
should merge and immediately raise their price to $5.49, telling the
buyer that it will sell either all or none at that price. The other two
low-cost firms continue to compete with each other, but neither of
them nor the two in combination have sufficient capacity to meet the
large buyers' needs. In this situation, the best deal the buyer can
obtain is to purchase 200 units from the post-merger firm for $5.49
and take competitive bids from the other two low-cost firms,
presumably purchasing the remaining 100 units for $5.00. This would
give the buyer total costs of $1,598. If it rejected the post-merger
firm's offer, its most favorable position would be to purchase the 200
units from the two non-merging low-cost firms at $5.00 and the
additional 100 units from one of the high-cost firms at $6.00, giving
total costs of $1,600.
Note that (1) the price increase in the illustration is significant,
from $1,500 to $1,598, or about 7 percent; (2) the price increase is
unilateral, in that the remaining two low-cost firms continue to
compete with each other and the four higher-cost firms continue to
compete with each other for the trade of smaller buyers; but (3) the
price increase will not occur if the remaining two low-cost sellers are
able at equivalent costs to increase their aggregate output to 300
units, thus satisfying the large buyers' entire demand. 79
79

See Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis,
11 Antitrust 21 (Spring 1997), who uses somewhat different illustrations and cites the
merger of two large pharmacy chains, Rite Aid and Revco, as matching the facts of one of
the illustrations. The principal buyer was Blue Cross, who preferred to deal with a single
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Government Guidelines
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines80 state that the
government may challenge mergers when nonmerging rivals are
subject to binding capacity constraints that prevent them from
increasing their own output significantly in response to the merged
firm's output reduction to below pre-merger levels. Such a merger is
most likely to be challenged where such capacity constraints are
unlikely to be removed within two years or existing excess capacity is
significantly more costly to use than capacity currently in production
and where the merging parties account for at least 35 percent of the
market. 81
large pharmacy rather than a large group of smaller ones, but who would be forced to pay a
higher price as a result of the merger.
However, the analysis exaggerates the ability of mergers of small market share to yield
high increases. Baker illustrates with a “market” of ten firms whose respective marginal
costs are 1, 2, 3, … 10, each of whom produces a single unit; and a buyer who requires
seven units. Before any merger and under perfect information the buyer pays a price of a
little under 56. Each of the seven low-cost sellers knows that it can charge any price up to
eight before the buyer will turn to the eighth seller; and so each of these sellers will bid just
under eight. But if any two of the seven low-cost sellers should merge and make an all-ornone offer, rejecting that offer would force the purchaser to turn to sellers eight and nine,
thus permitting each actual seller in the market to bid a price just under nine. As a result,
the price of the seven units goes from just under 56 to just under 63.
Baker then posits that this is a merger that reduces the number of firms in the market
from 10 equal firms to 9 (eight one-unit firms plus one two-unit firm), and raising the HHI
from 1000 to 1200. Thus a merger covering only 20 percent of the market yields a price
increase of 12.5 percent. See Baker, id. at 26 n.29. However, the marginal costs differences
are so significant that much smaller market definitions would be warranted. Firm 1 has
marginal costs of 1, firm 2 of 2, firm 3 of 3, and so on. Under usual market definition
criteria firms 1 and 2 together would constitute a relevant market because even high-cost
firm 2 could raise its price by 50 percent to 3 without losing sales. As a result, a merger of
firms 1 and 2 would be counted as a merger to monopoly. If firms 1 and 3 were to merge,
their collective sales plus the sales of firm 2 would count as a market, for firm 3 could still
raise its price by one-third above its costs without incurring consumer defections to firm 4.
In that case post-merger market shares would be 67 percent for firm 1-3, and 33 percent for
firm 2, yielding an HHI of 5578, more than triple the Guidelines threshold for high
concentration and presumptive illegality. See 4 Antitrust Law ¶932a (3d ed. 2009).
Of course, if one completely ignores costs and looks at current prices, then the smallest
relevant market consists of firms 1-7. See also Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb,
Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, ch. 3, in Handbook of Antitrust
Economics (Paolo Buccirossi, ed., MIT Press, 2008).
80
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines §2.22.
81
See Foster, No. 07-352, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47606 (D.N.M. 2007), motion for
preliminary injunction denied, FTC v. Foster, 2007 WL 1793441 (D.N.M. Apr. 29, 2007)
(concluding that the FTC defined the geographic market too narrowly and that nonmerging entities would be able to reposition themselves in response to a post-merger price
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increase). The FTC ultimately dismissed the complaint. See Foster, 2007 WL 2985369
(Oct. 3, 2007).

